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On 13 September 2018, more than five years after Edward Snowden revealed the existence 
of electronic (mass) surveillance programmes run by the intelligence services of the United 
States of America and the United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) 
found two UK data collection regimes – one of which will not be discussed here[1] – to violate 
Article 8 of the ECHR.[2] A third one, being part of the information sharing arrangements 
between these so-called “Five Eyes” countries was, on the contrary, considered to involve a 
justified interference with the right to respect for private life 
While the long-awaited Big Brother Watch and Others v. UK judgment, which joined three 
actions, signifies another victory for civil liberties and privacy advocating non-profit 
organisations and activists – no less than 16 being the applicants in this case – some serious 
matters of concern remain. Indeed, the ECtHR did not regard a number of the most intrusive 
aspects of these highly contested surveillance practices to be problematic: interception of 
communications and related communications data in bulk continues to be possible (both by 
intelligence and law enforcement authorities) and information gathered by the US’s National 
Security Agency (‘NSA’) under its infamous PRISM and Upstream programmes can still 
lawfully be requested and further processed by the UK’s Government Communications 
Headquarters (‘GCHQ’). 
A comparison with relevant case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’), 
who has, in a number of landmark judgments relating to surveillance by government authorities 
(i.e. Digital Rights Ireland, Schrems, Tele2 Sverige and Opinion 1/15), set rather high privacy 
and data protection standards, will help to put this judgment into perspective: the extensive 
safeguards established in Luxembourg should remain the point of reference within Europe. 
Strasbourg should not be lowering these thresholds instead. While it is true that the cases 
before the CJEU all concerned the processing of personal data for law enforcement purposes, 
the cited case-law is nevertheless relevant in the context of the assessment of secret 
surveillance conducted by intelligence services. Despite a recent formal contestationof the 
Court of Justice’s competences in that regard, it is clear from its decision in Schrems, in which 
it invalidated the Safe Harbour Decision in view of the clear inadequacy of the United States’ 
data protection regime following the Snowden revelations on the NSA run PRISM and 
Upstream programmes, that it already assessed intelligence practices. 
Interception of communications and related communications data in bulk continues to 
be possible by both intelligence and law enforcement authorities … 
Under Chapter I ‘Interception’ of the UK’s Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
(‘RIPA’) bulk interception of communications can be permitted. More in particular, the 
Secretary of State may warrant “the interception of external communications in the course of 
their transmission by means of a telecommunications systems” when he believes that it is 
necessary in the interests of national security, for the purpose of preventing or detecting 
serious crime, or for safeguarding, in circumstances relevant to the interests of national 
security, the economic well-being of the United Kingdom. The conduct authorised must be 
proportionate to what is sought to be achieved and shall also be taken to include the obtaining 
of “related communications data”, that is to say data which “relates to the communication or to 
the sender or recipient, or intended recipient, of the communication” or else “metadata”. In a 
certificate accompanying the warrant, the Secretary of State must also set out a description of 
the intercepted material considered necessary to examine. It must be noted that, remarkably 
enough, not only the intelligence services but also the law enforcement authorities may apply 
for such a warrant. 
In the execution of the warrant, four stages of this so-called “section 8(4) RIPA regime” can be 
distinguished: firstly, communications are intercepted from a “small” percentage of Internet 
“bearers”[3], selected as being most likely to carry external communications of intelligence 
value; secondly, the intercepted communications being the least likely to be of intelligence 
value, will be filtered out and automatically discarded (in near real-time); subsequently, simple 
selectors and complex search criteria (application of the latter most likely involving 
“profiling”) are being applied to the remaining communications, with those matching these 
selectors and criteria being retained and those that do not being discarded, in order to select 
communications that are likely to be of intelligence value; finally, some (if not all) of the 
remaining data are examined by an analyst. The Court noted that “[a]lthough the section 8(4) 
certificate sets out the general categories of information which might be examined, […] in 
practice, it is the selection of the bearers, the application of simple selectors […] and then 
complex searches which determined what communications were examined”. 
The applicants, bearing in mind the ECtHR’s judgment in Roman Zakharov v. Russia, argued 
that the Weber criteria[4] – being the minimum requirements established by the Court that 
have to be set out in law in order to avoid abuses of power contrary to the “in accordance with 
the law” and “necessary in a democratic society” conditions of Article 8(2) of the ECHR in 
relation to a (targeted or untargeted) secret surveillance regime –, were not met and in any 
event did no longer suffice in the light of “technological developments [following which] 
Governments [can] now create detailed and intrusive profiles of intimate aspects of private life 
by analysing patters of communications on a bulk basis”. They accordingly proposed an 
“update” of those conditions by including, amongst others, a requirement for “objective 
evidence of reasonable suspicion” in relation to the persons for whom data was being sought. 
The Court, accepting – very blatantly and explicitly in the case at hand – that bulk interception 
regimes do not per se fall outside the wide margin of appreciation that Governments have in 
choosing how best to achieve the legitimate aim of protecting national security, disagreed by 
stating that “[b]ulk interception is by definition untargeted, and to require “reasonable 
suspicion” would render the operation of such a scheme impossible”. What was on the other 
hand considered to be of great concern is the lack of robust independent oversight of both the 
selectors and the search criteria during the third execution stage of the warrant (see supra). 
On top of that, the Court required the categories that are set out in the stage four certificates 
to be spelled out in less general terms and instead “by reference to specific operations or 
mission purposes”. Though the Court also considered it desirable for the selection of Internet 
bearers in the first stage of the warrant’s execution to be subjected to greater oversight, it did 
not find that fact alone to be fatal for the Article 8 compliance of the section 8(4) regime. The 
absence of pre-authorisation for the stage four selection of material by analysts was also not 
considered, in and of itself, to amount to a failure to provide adequate safeguards against 
abuse. Taken together, however, the establishment of the nearly unsupervised discretion – 
especially in stage 3 – for the British authorities to determine which of the intercepted 
communications are to be examined, led the ECtHR to conclude that there had been a violation 
of Article 8 of the Convention. More specifically, domestic law was not considered to give 
citizens an adequate indication of the circumstances in which their communications could be 
intercepted and subsequently selected for examination. As such, the second Weber criterion, 
requiring a definition of the categories of people liable to have their private life interfered with, 
had been infringed. 
The other five Weber requirements were all considered to be complied with. A discussion of 
the Court’s reasoning in this regard, including an assessment of the Chapter I section 15 and 
16 RIPA safeguards, is, however, not included in this blog. It is nevertheless important to note 
that the exemption (!) of related communications data, in the section 8(4) regime from all 
requirements of section 16 was found to violate Article 8 ECHR. 
… in spite of the by the CJEU established standards in that regard 
The CJEU, in Digital Rights Ireland and especially in Tele2 Sverige, made clear that, in 
restricting the right to respect for private life and the right to protection of personal data, a law 
providing for the general and indiscriminate retention by communications service providers of 
communications metadata exceeds the limits of what is “strictly necessary” as such legislation 
does not require there to be any relationship between the data which must be retained and the 
objective pursued. Targeted retention based on objective criteria, which may vary according 
to the nature of the measures, built on objective evidence, on the other hand, was not 
prohibited. In concrete terms, the Court required the retention measure to be limited with 
respect to the “categories of data to be retained, the means of communication affected, 
the persons concerned and the retention period adopted”. Whereas in Digital Rights 
Ireland the delimitation of the public affected (“persons concerned”) was still portrayed as 
optional, it became mandatory after the judgement in Tele2 Sverige. The Court suggested a 
geographical criterion in that regard. 
More recently, however, in Opinion 1/15, the transfer of the PNR data of all air passengers, 
regardless of whether there is any objective evidence that can link them to terrorism or serious 
transnational crime, flying between the European Union and Canada, was nonetheless 
regarded to be in compliance with the principle of proportionality. Upon receipt, the Canadian 
authorities run the PNR data against pre-established models and criteria – “profiles” – for 
the purpose of newly identifying certain passengers liable to present a risk to public security, 
which might give rise to additional checks and potential arrests of those persons at the border. 
The Court stipulated that considering the extent of the interference “essentially depends on 
those models and criteria” they “should be specific and reliable, making it possible, as the 
Advocate General […] observed […] to arrive at results targeting individuals who might be 
under a ‘reasonable suspicion’ […]” . The latter had, as have done the applicants in Big 
Brother Watch v. UK, based himself in that regard on the ECtHR’s judgment in Roman 
Zakharov v. Russia in which it ruled that the Russian mobile communications and 
communications data retention regime violated the Convention as it regarded the judicial 
scrutiny of the authorisation of access by the intelligence authorities to the retained data to be 
limited in scope, since it was neither provided with sufficient information to assess whether 
there was a sufficient factual basis to reasonably suspect a particular person nor instructed to 
verify the existence of a reasonable suspicion against the person concerned.[5] 
PNR schemes are, however, while thus comparable to a certain extent, notably less intrusive 
than the section 8(4) regime as described above. Not in the least because the latter system 
concerns mainly, though not exclusively, the actual content of communications, whereas the 
Court of Justice, in Opinion 1/15, dealt with air passengers travel information. According to the 
Court in Luxembourg, the essence of the right to respect for private life would even be affected 
by the “acquisition of knowledge of the content of […] electronic communications”. On top of 
that, anyone’s data could potentially be intercepted with a section 8(4) warrant. The public 
affected by the draft PNR Canada Agreement – air passengers flying from the EU to Canada 
– is, to the contrary, clearly delimitated[6], which is one of the reasons why the CJEU adopted 
a different approach in Digital Rights Ireland and Tele2 Sverige on the one hand, and Opinion 
1/15 on the other. However, as opposed to what the CJEU decided in the former two cases – 
where it concerned data retained for law enforcement purposes –, Strasbourg did not consider 
the bulk retention[7] of data as such for national security reasons by communication service 
providers to be problematic in Roman Zakharov v. Russia and as such could not be said to 
have deviated now, in Big Brother Watch v. UK, from its previous case-law. Yet, assuming that 
a somewhat more lenient approach vis-à-vis the collection of data in bulk could be justified on 
the basis of the nature[8] of the authorities concerned, it must be reiterated that the tools 
foreseen in the section 8(4) regime are not only available for intelligence services but also for 
law enforcement agencies (see supra). 
In any event, the ECtHR, as did the CJEU in Opinion 1/15, should, in Big Brother Watch v. UK, 
have put forward the “reasonable suspicion” criterion as the condition to be complied with 
when determining the selectors and search criteria in stage 3 – and thus not in the initial 
phase of interception – of the warrant’s execution, instead of merely requiring them to be 
subjected to (non-public) independent oversight. Admittedly, had the Court in Strasbourg 
applied this criterion in stage 1 instead, as suggested by the applicants in this case, it would 
indeed have gone further than it had done previously in Roman Zakharov v. Russia. 
Nevertheless, this does not change the fact that the Court in Strasbourg, unlike the CJEU, 
gave no indication whatsoever as to how the selectors and search criteria should be 
determined and as such on how to constrict the access by the intelligence authorities to bulk 
amounts of personal data of individuals. 
PRISM and Upstream do not involve your right to respect for private life  
Without going into all the details of the information sharing arrangements that exist between 
the US and the UK and the latter’s own rules in that regard, it may, bearing in mind 
the Schrems case-law, moreover surprise that, the ECtHR regarded the request and use – 
provided the section 8(4) safeguards are applied in this context as well – by the UK’s 
intelligence services of personal data potentially gathered by the NSA in the context of its 
aforementioned secret surveillance programmes to be in accordance with Article 8 of the 
Convention. In fact, Strasbourg did not consider the interception itself of communications in 
this regime to be part of “the interference under consideration” as “[it does] not […] occur within 
the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction, and was [thus] not attributable to the State under 
international law”. In the reasoning of the Court, a circumvention of a State’s own rules or of 
their Convention obligations can be prevented when the circumstances in which such a request 
can be made are sufficiently circumscribed. The level of circumscription could, however, never 
undo or remedy a violation – in European standards – of privacy and data protection rights that 
occurred in a third country still in the phase of collection. On top of that, it need be noted that, 
as is the case in stage 2 and 3 in the execution of a section 8(4) regime warrant, nowhere is 
mentioned, that the data received in bulk are filtered and partly discarded before being 
examined by analysts. In that regard, judge Koskelo and judge Turkovic noted in a separate 
opinion that “the shortcomings referred to […] in the context of the section 8(4) regime also 
attach to the intelligence-sharing regime”. 
Referring to Big Brother Watch v. UK as a long and complicated case would be an 
understatement. This blog does not therefore contend to be exhaustive in its description and 
assessment of the judgment. It is clear, however, that the issues identified above are not the 
least. Violations of Article 8 ECHR have been established, but big brother may continue 
watching you. 
  
[1] The Chapter 2 RIPA regime. 
[2] The ECtHR also had to assess whether the regimes violated Articles 10, 6, and 14 in 
combination with Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention. However, the Court’s respective 
conclusions in that regard will not be discussed for the purposes of this blog. 
[3] See §9 Big Brother Watch and Others v. UK. 
[4] The Weber requirements (see §370 Big Brother Watch and Others v. UK): the nature of the 
offences which may give rise to an interception order; a definition of the categories of people 
liable to have their communications intercepted; a limit on the duration of interception; the 
procedure to be followed for examining, using and storing the data obtained; the precautions 
to be taken when communicating the data to other parties; and the circumstances in which 
intercepted data may or must be erased or destroyed. 
[5] In Roman Zakharov v. Russia, the applicant complained about the requirement for mobile 
network operators in Russia to create databases in which they had to store all mobile telephone 
communications and related communications data of their subscribers for three years. He also 
challenged the subsequent direct remote access the authorities had thereto. 
[6] In that sense, the transfer of PNR data could even be considered targeted. 
[7] To be distinguished from the subsequent access by the intelligence authorities to the 
retained data; “retention” is here compared with “interception”. 
[8] Intelligence services v. law enforcement authorities. 
 
